ABSTRACT With the rising popularity of cloud computing technology, many positive effects have been exerted, whereas many security issues arise. The main existing way to ensure data confidentiality is to encrypt the data. However, the encrypted data renders keyword indexing more difficult to achieve, and the way to specify the plain-text keywords for the cipher-text data also reveals the privacy of the data owner to the untrusted service provider. In the meantime, many challenges are imposed on the software-based methods to index encrypted data, and existing hardware-based solutions typically have a large code footprint in a trusted environment. To solve these problems, an SGX-based secure indexing solution was built based on the combination of hardware and software and using Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology. The results of the security analysis suggest that our scheme only leaks the access patterns, and our trust code protected by the SGX hardware is very small, thereby minimizing the exposed attack surface. Besides, our experiments verify that our scheme is efficient and practical, both in performance and storage aspects.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the booming of the computer technology and internet applications, the growth of data and applications increases dramatically, and the public demand for data storage is also rising. Spurred by this, cloud storage service has been welcomed by a growing number of users for its convenience and cost saving. However, in such a way, the users lose their absolute control over the data, thus inevitably arousing their attention to its security [1] - [4] . The main existing way to ensure the data confidentiality is to encrypt the data [5] , [6] .
Cloud storage often has considerable data, so one of the crucial ways to retrieve the data is keyword indexing. However, the encrypted data renders keyword indexing more difficult to achieve and meantime, the way to specify the plain-text keywords for the cipher-text data also to some extent reveals the privacy of the data owner to the untrustworthy service provider. To address this problem, the indexing method should be studied for the cipher-text data, which can effectively index the required data while ensuring confidentiality and privacy. Though there have been some research results related to cipher-text data indexing technology at
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A. RELATED WORKS
The indexable encrypted method based on the public key was originally proposed by Boneh et al. [9] . Using the IdentityBased Encryption (IBE) technology, they constructed traps and achieved indexing. Li et al. [10] built an indexable encryption scheme based on public key that supports multi-user and licensable index using the predicate encryption technology. The scheme introduces a trusted third party to yield indexing traps, which is inefficient, and the indexing method is determined by the file type. Accordingly, the application scenario of the scheme is limited. Though the indexable encryption method based on public key has made great progress and can support the flexible query syntax, because it is built based on the assumption of complex mathematics, and there are often numerous bilinear pairing operations, the efficiency is relatively low and not applicable to considerable data in the cloud storage environment.
The concept of Oblivious RAMs, first proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [11] , theoretically solves the problem of private keyword indexing on the symmetrically encrypted remote cipher-text data. Their theoretical model is asymptotically efficient, whereas the practical application exhibits low efficiency, because there are significant constants in the performance complexity representations of this scheme. Cash et al. [12] developed a dynamic indexable encryption method capable of efficiently indexing huge databases. Their scheme is capable of supporting cipher-text data index containing tens of billions of records and keyword pairs. The indexing methods for single keyword were introduced in the above research. However, in the practical applications, the index of a single keyword is commonly very large, and the file is difficult to accurately locate. To enhance indexing efficiency, the multi-keyword indexing method should be studied.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
Based on the mentioned analysis, a scheme was proposed to index the encrypted data using SGX. The protection feature of SGX was used to achieve the balance between security, performance and function. Based on software, our scheme, compared with the current fastest scheme with scope queries, [13] , has significantly enhanced performance and facilitated the storage. Compared with the latest hardwarebased scheme [14] , security and extensibility have been enhanced.
It was confirmed that our scheme is superior to the existing methods based on software and hardware. Even if the index of the large data is complex, indexing can be achieved quickly, and the index can be extended to almost any large index. In the aspect of side channel attack, only the access pattern is leaked. The trusted code protected by SGX hardware is very small, and so as the attack surface exposed. Considering the efficiency, security, software integrity and comfort of the users, this scheme shows a promising market application. In the meantime, the whole system was tested repeatedly in attacks to ensure that it is safe in application.
Our major contributions are presented as follows. 1) Our scheme is superior to the existing methods based on software and hardware. Even if the indexing of large data is complex, our indexing time exhibits great advantages.
2) Very small code and memory footprints have been achieved. Our scheme can still be extended to almost unlimited search index size, i.e., the index size is limited only by general insecure hardware resource.
3) The secure structure based SGX was designed, which only leaks the access pattern, and our trusted code protected by the SGX hardware is very small, thereby minimizing the exposed attack surface.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. INTEL SOFTWARE GUARD EXTENSIONS (SGX)
Intel Software Guard Extension (Intel SGX) is shipped with the processors released by Intel in 2013 using the new technologies of the Skylake architecture that is used to enhance software security. It primarily aims to create a trusted space (like sandbox) on the computer platform to protect the confidentiality and integrity of user key code and data. 
1) MEMORY ISOLATION
On the platform supporting SGX, the program can be split into two parts: one part is untrusted, and the other is trusted. The trusted part is known as ''enclave'' in the SGX terminology, located in a dedicated part of the physical RAM. On this portion of the memory, the SGX hardware performs additional protections, and all other software (including the privileged software, e.g., OS, hypervisor, firmware and code in the System Management Mode (SMM)) cannot access the enclave memory.
2) AUTHENTICATION
SGX exhibits the remote authentication function, verifying whether the enclave is properly created on the remote system. During the creation of the enclave, the initial code and data loaded into the enclave will be measured, which can be presented to an external party to verify the correct creation of the enclave. The authenticity of the measurement is derived from the benign enclave ensured by the signature provided by the authentication function of SGX, which is given by a component named Quote Area (QE). QE only accepts the measurement results from the software and hardware and ensures that only the correct enclave is measured. Besides, the remote authentication function allows for building a secure channel between the external party and the enclave.
Side channel attack allows the attackers to extract sensitive information by observing the effects of sensitive information processing without being required to directly access the information source. It has been known for a long time, and its variants have been studied previously, including the hardware side channels (e.g. the ground potential, EM or power consumption). [15] suggests that the extraction of sensitive information from the enclave of SGX is allowed. However, all of these side channel attacks are noisy and require repeated executions and measurements to extract sensitive information.
B. INVERTED INDEX
The file set f and the inverted index δ act as the initial inputs. Unlike the file index, the inverted index refers to a structure starting from the keyword. Each keyword is followed by a set of files containing it. An example of a simple inverted index is shown in Fig. 1 . Because the keyword contained in each file was assumed to be pre-selected in this study, the selection of the keyword for the file is not the focus of this section.
The major index structure of the scheme is shown in Fig. 2 . Fig. 2 shows the index structure formed based on the example of the inverted index in Fig. 1 . Among them, the lookup table contains all the keywords in the system, and each keyword in the table points to a linked list in the index array. However, in the index array, the element acts as a pair of a file and a keyword, and each element refers to a unique pair of a file and a keyword, organized by a keyword-directed linked list. For instance, the keyword w 3 values 2 in the lookup table, pointing to the node with the position of 2 in the index array. There is a pointer in the node with the position of 2, pointing to the position of 7, the pointer in the position of 7 points to the position of 0, and subsequently the traversal ends. By traversing the linked list of the keyword w 3 , all the files containing the keyword w 3 can be found. In the index array, all the nodes are stored in the random locations.
To achieve efficient file update, the delete table and delete array are built in the scheme, which work as the lookup table and lookup array do. The only difference is that during the scheme building, the file index is used instead of the inverted index. Thus, the linked list is guided by the file, making the addition and deletion of files more efficient. Though in the delete array, the structure of the node element differs from that in the index array, it is also in the form of the file-keyword pair. Accordingly, there is a one-to-one correlation between the elements in the two arrays. Such one-to-one corresponding nodes are hereinafter referred to as the dual nodes.
III. DESIGN A. SCHEME DESIGN
The SGX-based secure indexing system we designed is split into five roles, including the user, the system client (the data owner, and thus trusted), the authentication platform, the untrusted SGX server, and the trusted SGX enclave in the server. The overall structural design of the system is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Step 1. The client prepares their data values by augmenting them with the index keywords. These values are stored in the pseudo-random locations. Subsequently, the secret key is inserted into the B+ tree, and the order where all nodes are stored is also pseudo-random. By adding the pointer to the leaf that specifies the random position of the corresponding value, the tree and value are linked. The value can be any data (e.g. a record in a relational database, or a file or document in other database types). Next, the client encrypts all the nodes of the tree with the secret key and all the data values. It deploys the encrypted B+ tree and values on the untrusted servers in the cloud storage.
Step 2. A secure connection is built between the client and the enclave. The client authenticate the enclave by exploiting the authentication function of SGX. Through this secure connection, the client presents SK k to the enclave. This step completes the settings of our scheme, and all the mentioned steps only require the execution once. Even when the enclave is unloaded (e.g. during rebooting), the state (including SK k ) can be safely restored from the local storage.
Step 3. The client can send index queries to the server. Random encryption is performed using the secret key SK k for all the index queries. Accordingly, an untrusted server cannot know anything about the queries, even if the same queries were sent previously. When the queries reach the enclave, SK k is adopted to decrypt them.
Step 4. The enclave loads the structure of the B+ tree (tree nodes without the values) from the untrusted storage into the enclave memory and then decrypts it.
Step 5. Only a part of the tree nodes are loaded into the enclave, the tree traverses from the root node. When the index reaches the edge of a node, whereas the node is not currently in the enclave, it will be obtained from the untrusted storage. In both cases, the indexing algorithm eventually reaches a set of leaf nodes which hold the pointers to the data values matching the queries. This list of pointers representing the indexing results is passed to the untrusted part. As the values are stored in random order, the untrusted part does not learn anything from the interaction except for the cardinality of the result set.
Step 6. The indexing results can be further processed (e.g. in conjunction with additional SQL operators), the results can be processed in the SGX enclave of the server.
Step 7. To complete the end-to-end secure indexing, the pointers are used to get the encrypted values from the untrusted storage and send them to the client. The client adopts SK v to decrypt the received file.
The plain-text data values are not available on the server. They are encrypted using the powerful standard encryption method RSA-CTR and never decrypted on the server, even they are not decrypted inside the SGX enclave. Only the user knowns the secret key to decrypt the data.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI-KEYWORD CIPHER-TEXT DATA INDEX BASED ON THE INVERTED INDEX
First, a dynamic scheme of the single keyword was built, and it was then improved to implement the multi-keyword index. The secure symmetric encryption method of CPA was employed to achieve the multi-keyword cipher-text data index.
Given the effect of the untrusted servers, to prevent the information leakage, all the entries and pointers in the table and all the nodes in the array should be stored encrypted. In this section, the results of the pseudo-random function and hash function were adopted as the inputs, and the XOR oper- ation was employed to encrypt the data. The homomorphic nature of the XOR operation allows the server to update the data without decrypting it. To be specific, the procedures are as follows.
1) Initialization phase Set F, G and P as three pseudo-random functions, H 1 and H 2 as two hash functions. The symmetric secret key yielded by the user is expressed as
For the user's file set f and the inverted index δ, a linked list L W is built for each keyword w ∈ w. Each linked list consists of #f w nodes (N 1 , . . . , N #f w ), as stored in the random positions of the search array A s . The structure of the defined
, where id i denotes the unique identifier of the file that contains the corresponding keyword; addr s (N ) refers to the token, indicating the position of the node N in the array A s . All the nodes in the linked list L W are XOR-encrypted using the function H 1 (P K 3 (w) , r i ), where r i denotes the random value stored in the node, K 3 is the secret key of the pseudo-random function P. The nodes not used in the array A s are filled with random bits.
For each keyword w, the corresponding element in the lookup table T s adopts the function F K 1 (w) and the pointer to the head node of the linked list L W as the key and the value, respectively, where K 1 denotes the secret key of the pseudo-random function F. The pointer is XOR-encrypted using the function G K 2 (w), where K 2 denotes the secret key of the pseudo-random function G.
After the initialization, the array A s and the lookup table T s are stored as the encrypted indices on the server side.
2) Indexing phase To index a certain keyword set W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, the user should first generate an index token τ s and send it to the server. The index token τ s contains F K 1 (w i ), G K 2 (w i ) and P K 3 (w i ) for each keyword w i W .
For each keyword w i W , the server adopts F K 1 (w i ) as the key to find the encrypted pointer in the lookup table T s , subsequently uses G K 2 (w i ) to decrypt it to generate the plaintext pointer of L w i and locates the node in the array A s , uses P K 3 (w i ) and the random value r stored in the respective node to decrypt the entire nodes in the linked list, and lastly obtains the file identifier set S i for the keyword w i . If the file is not distinguishable from the file identifier, S i will be equivalent to f w i .
For a series of indexing results S 1 , . . . , S n , the server calculates the intersection I and outputs it as the final result.
3) File dynamic update To achieve efficient file update, a delete array A d was also built in this section, storing a linked list with a file index structure, so that the server can quickly delete files. In the delete array A d , for each file f , there is a linked list L f with #f nodes (D 1 , . . . , D #f ). Each node D i is associated with a keyword w i , and there is a dual node N in the linked list L w i of the index array. Set N −1 and N +1 as the previous and next nodes of the node N in the linked list L w i respectively, the structure of the node D i is defined as follows:
where the token N i denotes the dual node of the node N i , i.e. the node D in the deleted array; the token addr d (D) is the position of the node D in the array A d . All the nodes in the linked list L f are XOR-encrypted using the function H 2 (P K 3 (f ) , r i ), where r i denotes a random value stored in the node; K 3 is the secret key of the pseudo-random function P. Likewise, for each file f , the delete table T d adopts F K 1 (f ) as the key and stores the pointer to the head node of the linked list L f . Besides, the pointer is XOR-encrypted using the function G K 2 (f ). When adding or deleting a file, the user will generate the add token τ a and the delete token τ d and then send them to the user. The server is able to update these pointers using the information in the token directly with decryption.
C. B + TREE OPTIMIZATION
To avoid the B+ tree for storing the data from being too large and beyond the scope of the SGX enclave, and from causing serious computation and communication overheads, the storage structure of the B + tree was designed with a memory space complexity of O(1).
Instead of loading all the nodes into the enclave, our main idea is to load only the nodes required by traversing the tree. The problem is to optimize the communication bottleneck between the untrusted part and the enclave, so the benchmark test and algorithm engineering were performed to determine and minimize the runtime consuming task (e.g. the switching between the untrusted part and the enclave). If all the data is stored and processed within the enclave, these data may be very large. Accordingly, the full data transferred to the enclave can cause severe computation and communication overheads. Though the size of the protected memory within the enclave is limited, there is no security risk of storing the data outside the enclave, because the data is encrypted based on the verified IND-CCA secure encryption scheme and then stored in random order. The untrusted part only receives the pointers of the values from the trusted part and then loads them from the memory or disk. However, all the nodes are encrypted in the major memory or on the disk, so they should be decrypted by the enclave. This will also cause a bit larger leakage than the first one, i.e., the leakage of the node index order.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The enclave refers to a protected area in the application's address space, and its security boundary only contains the CPU itself. In other words, once the software and data are stored in the enclave, even the operating system or the VMM Hypervisor cannot affect the code and data in the enclave. Thus, the confidentiality and integrity of information can still be provided using the SGX technology in the presence of malware. For this reason, the problems of unforgeability and information leakage caused by quoting SGX were primarily solved.
A. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MECHANISM BASED ON BILINEAR MAP ACCUMULATOR
Initialization Stage: Set H 3 as an anti-collision hash function, select the bilinear pairing parameters (p, G, g,e, g), and adopt s ∈ Z * p as a random secret trap. Calculate g, g s , g s 2 , . . . , g s q as a public parameter, where q should be at least q ≥ max {#f w } w∈W .
For all w ∈ W , the leaf nodes were built as follows.
The Merkle tree is built using a hash function H 3 and a randomly arranged set of leaf nodes L = {θ w } w∈W . The built tree is stored on the server side, and the user should only store the root node value of the tree. Proof Stage: After completing the search for the keyword set W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, the server obtains a set S 1 , . . . , S n corresponding to each keyword, and calculates an intersection I W = S 1 ∩S 2 ∩. . .∩S n , where I W = {id 1 , . . . , id m }. The server then calculates the proof π = {T , S, C} as follows.
(a) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, find the leaf node θ i corresponding to the first element equal to F K 1 (w i ) in the Merkle tree, and generate a proof t i for the leaf node.t i contains all siblings on θ i and from θ i to the root node, set T = {t 1 , . . . , t n }.
(b) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the polynomial is calculated as:
Besides, the public parameter g, g s , g s 2 , . . . , g s q is employed to calculate the value of g p i . Set S = {g p 1 , . . . , g p n } be the subset evidence.
(c) Given the P 1 , . . . , P n calculated in step (b), find the polynomial q 1 , . . . , q n using the extended Euclidean algorithm such that q 1 P 1 + q 2 P 2 + . . . + q n P n = 1 is satisfied. Let C = {g q 1 , . . . , g q n } be complete evidence.
Verification Stage: Given a set of index results I = {id 1 , . . . , id m } and a proof π = {T , S, C} for the collection, the user verifies as follows. 
where g p i denotes the element in S and g q i is the corresponding element in C. If all the verification processes pass, I will be considered correct, i.e., it is indeed the correct result obtained by S 1 , . . . , S n through the intersection operation. The user can accept the result as the final index result.
The unforgeability of the scheme indicates that the results of the forged index should not produce the correct and valid evidence for the adversary.
If there is a PPT adversary A makes Forge A (k) = 1, there will be a simulator S capable of breaking at least one of the following security assumptions. 2) Bilinear q-SDH assumption. Assuming that after executing the indexing algorithm for the keyword set W, the file identifier set I = I W and the valid proof π = {T , S, C} passes all the verifications in the verification algorithm, i.e., the forgery of the adversary A is successful. According to the steps, the forgery can be split into the following three cases.
Type I forgery. For a certain keyword w i ∈ W , the adversary uses a forged leaf nodeθ w i in the prooft i of the Merkle tree and passes Step (a) in the verification algorithm.
Type II forgery. For some keywords w i ∈ W , there is I ⊂ S i , which does not satisfy the subset condition. The adversary gives the right proof t i of the Merkle tree and a forged subset evidenceĝ P i , and passes Step (b) in the verification algorithm.
Type III forgery. The set I refers tp a true subset of the set I w , not satisfying the completeness. The adversary gives the correct subset evidence S = {g A , . . . , g P n } and a forged completeness proofĈ, and then passes Step (c) in the verification algorithm.
Obviously, if I = I W and π can pass the verification, it must belong to one of the three forgery cases. In fact, for a simulator S, if type I forgery occurs, S can break the collision resistance of the hash function H 3 . If type II forgery or type III forgery occurs, S can break the bilinear q-SDH assumption. The specific implementation details are as follows.
1) When type I forgery occurs, setθ w i = (θ w i ,1 ,θ w i ,2 ). Passing
Step (a) in the verification algorithm suggests that the following two conditions are true. a)
b) The verification of the Merkle tree for the leaf nodeθ w i is successful.
It is revealed that the only possibility for the adversary to forgeθ w i is to forgeθ w i ,2 , and passing the verification of the Merkle tree indicates that the adversary has found a collision of the hash function H 3 , thus violating the collision resistance of the hash function H 3 .
2) When type II forgery occurs, set the adversary output a set I = {x 1 , . . . , x m }, the subset evidence beĝ P i , and S i = (id 1 , . . . , id q ) as the file identifier set containing the keyword w i . Subsequently, g (s+id 1 )(s+id 2 )...(s+id q ) is the corresponding bilinear accumulated value. Since I ⊂ S i , there must be some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), making x j / ∈ S i . The adversary passes Step (b) in the verification algorithm, suggesting that the following equation holds:
in which (s + id 1 ) (s + id 2 ) . . . s + id q cannot be split by the factor (s+x j ). Accordingly, there exists a polynomial Q(s) with q−1 degrees and a constant c = 0 to make the following equation holds:
Subsequently, the following equation is yielded:
Next, the following equation is yielded finally as:
It is suggested that the simulator S can solve the bilinear q-SDH problem in polynomial time with the help of the output of the adversary, which violates the bilinear q-SDH assumption.
3) When type III forgery occurs, set the adversary output a set I = {x 1 , . . . , x m } and a completeness proofĈ. Since I is a true subset of I W , there is at least one common factor in the polynomial P 1 , . . . , P n . Let (s + x) be one of the common factors, in which x / ∈ I . The adversary passes Step (c) in the verification algorithm, suggesting that the following equation holds:
By calculating
each P i , then we have the following equation:
Thus, the simulator S can easily calculate:
Thus a solution to an instance of the bilinear q-SDH problem has been found, which also violates the bilinear q-SDH assumption. In summary, if the adversary can forge a valid evidence, then there is a simulator that can break at least one of the assumptions. Accordingly, for any PPT adversary A, the following probability inequality holds:
in which negl(k) is a negligible function with the security parameter k as the input. Thus, the multi-keyword indexing scheme proposed in this section is unforgeable.
B. SECURITY OPTIMIZATION BASED ON SGX SIDE CHANNEL
Under the protection of SGX, the attacker cannot directly enter the enclave. However, the attacker may extract the sensitive information through potential channels. To be specific, the attacker aims to learn the B+ tree structure representing the order relationship in the index data and then attack the structure. The possible forms of attack are as follows (all of these deviations affect the correctness of the protocol, whereas they do not affect the security).
1) Do not pass the root node to the enclave.
2) Pass the wrong node to the enclave.
3) Do not pass all the requested nodes to the enclave. 4) Do not pass all the results to the client.
The so-called multi-set hash was used as a building block to prevent the 2)-4) with only O(1) additional storage. The hash with multiple values was set as a size-fixed bit string, capable of adding elements incrementally and efficiently. The order of the input can be arbitrary, and the equality checking should be achieved for two multi-set hashes. If the hashes calculated by the same elements independent to the orders, the two multi-set hashes will be equal. MSet-XOR-Hash from the reference [16] can act as a multiple hash.
The building of the B+ tree is changed as follows. The root node and each internal node x store the sub-identifier x.id i next to the pointer x.p i , and each leaf node x stores the hash x.hash i with the plain-text value next to the pointer x.p i . The ID of the root node root.id is sent along with SK k in the secure channel built in the setup phase.
For each node x received by the Trusted, the Trusted decrypts the node and checks whether x.id matches the root.id. If so, it will create a new random number; otherwise, it will wait for a random number from the Untrusted. If there is no random number or node has been received except the root node, the process will be terminated, preventing 1).
For each incoming node, the number of nodes expected to be received decreases. When the number of nodes expected to be received becomes 0, and the last ID of each received node is added, the Trusted will compare the hash values of the node expected to be received with those of the received node. If these hashes are not consistent, the Trusted will not accept the node from the Untrusted, and then terminate and delete the random number. Accordingly, the matching should be ensured by traversing all the nodes that may contain the qualified results to avoid 2) and 3). Otherwise, it will add x.hash i to the hash value of the result and return the result and the HMAC of the hash value of the result. The Untrusted adds the HMAC to the client's response. After the decryption, the client calculates the value of the multiple hash based on the received value, creates an HMAC and then compares it with the received HMAC. The HMAC comparison prevents 4).
V. EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS
Based on the implementation, the system performance was tested and analyzed in this section. The email data set from Enron company was used in this test, with the version of May 7th, 2015 and the source from https://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼enron/. 1000 emails in this set were selected randomly as the test files, and all the words of the file names were adopted as the keywords.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The communication overhead of the scheme is primarily determined by the number of the files and the proof of the size of π . When n keywords are simultaneously indexed from t different keywords in total, the data size of the communication will be O(m + nlogt), where m denotes the number of the files in the indexing result. In the experiment, for the size of the file, the size of the file identifier id(f ) was only considered, instead of the size of the file itself. This was because in the indexing and verification phase, id(f ) can be used to fully represent the file (the verification of the results). The user can choose to let the server send the cipher-text file with the specified identifier after the verification is passed. Thus, the scheme does not include this step.
The communication overhead is split into two parts, one is the size of the collection and the other is the size of the proof. Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the communication overhead and the number of keywords used in the index.
When the number of keywords used in the index is increased, the size of the indexing result becomes smaller and smaller, then approaches zero. This is because the more keywords are used, the fewer indexing results are eligible. In this case, the main factor affecting the communication overhead is the proof data for the result, namely O(nlogt). Since the CS scheme can only index and prove single keyword, the more keywords, the larger the data needed to be sent back to the client.
B. INDEXING AND PROVING OVERHEADS
The computing overhead of the server can be split into the indexing overhead and the proving overhead. Let N be the size of all the keywords of the inverted index, the asymptotic running time of the server is O(N log 2 NloglogN ) 10 4 in theory. In the actual operation, the main computational overhead on the server is the exponential calculation of group elements, which is used to calculate the subset evidence and the completeness evidence. Fig. 5 shows the relationship between the number of keywords used in the index and the indexing time of the server. As expected, the indexing time is linear with the number of keywords. The indexing time of our scheme of this section is slightly higher than that of the CS scheme, because of the additional operations, such as the intersection operations. Moreover, as the relationship between the proving time and the number of keywords shown in Fig. 6 , the computational cost of this scheme is much larger than that of the CS scheme, due to the large number of group element exponential operations. However, note that when the scheme is proved, the efficiency of these calculations will be highly dependent on the selected curve parameters and the pairing algorithm because the main calculation time is caused by the exponential and pairing operations of the group elements. Given that the parameters and algorithms can be optimized continuously, the efficiency can be further enhanced. Besides, the algorithm of the server can also be optimized in the implementation, significantly reducing the time spent in the proof phase. For instance, multi-thread and pre-calculated P i and g P i can be used to calculate the set of evidences. To faithfully reflect the original execution efficiency of this scheme, no optimization method was employed in the experiments introduced in this section, i.e., let the server perform all the calculation steps in single thread.
C. VERIFICATION OVERHEAD
The verification algorithm running on the client has the asymptotic running time of O(m + nlogt). Compared with the indexing time and proving time of the server, the client has a very small computation overhead.
The relationship between the number of keywords and the time cost is shown in Fig. 7 to verify all the proofs. Our scheme requires additional verifications of the intersection evidences, so the computation overhead is greater than that of the CS scheme. However, after the verifications, the CS scheme requires additional intersection operations on the client, which are not required in our scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the present study, a multi-keyword indexing method on the encrypted data with the hardware support was introduced, which can serve as a secure index in the encrypted cloud storage. Our solution scheme outperforms the existing methods based on the software and hardware. Even for the complex indexing of the big data, our indexing time has a big advantage, and our scheme can be extended to almost all large indexes. Our scheme only leaks the access pattern, and the trusted code protected by the SGX hardware is very small, thereby minimizing the exposed attack surface. 
